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Abstract
We present efficient algorithms for computing optimal or approximately optimal strategies in
a zero-sum game for which Player I has n pure strategies and Player II has an arbitrary number
of pure strategies. We assume that for any given mixed strategy of Player I, a best response
or “approximate” best response of Player II can be found by an oracle in time polynomial in
n. We then show how our algorithms may be applied to several search games with applications
to security and counter-terrorism. We evaluate our main algorithm experimentally on a pro-
totypical search game. Our results show it performs well compared to an existing, well-known
algorithm for solving zero-sum games that can also be used to solve search games, given a best
response oracle.
1 Introduction
Consider a zero-sum game with positive integer payoffs in which Player I (the maximizer) has n
pure strategies and Player II (the minimizer) has an arbitrary number of pure strategies. The
payoff function is denoted by C, so that if Players I and II play pure strategies i and j, respectively,
then the payoff is given by C(i, j). We also allow the arguments of C to be probability vectors
expressing mixed strategies, in which case C denotes expected payoffs. Whenever we refer to games
in this paper we assume they are of this form. Optimal mixed strategies and the value of the game
can be found solving a linear program, but if Player II’s strategy set is very large compared to n
then the computational time required to do this may not be polynomial in n.
Examples of this nature frequently arise in the study of finite search games for an immobile
Hider. In such games, which are played between a Hider and a Searcher, the Hider typically
has a strategy set corresponding to n locations in which to hide and the Searcher’s strategy set
corresponds to a permutation of those locations (or a subset thereof), corresponding to the order in
which she searches the locations. The order of search may be restricted due to a network structure
of the search space or other restrictions on the mode of search. Notwithstanding this, the size of
the Searcher’s strategy set is usually exponential in n. The payoff of the game is generally either
some cost incurred by the Searcher in searching for the Hider, which she wishes to minimize, or the
probability of detection, which she wishes to maximize.
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Search games are motivated by wide-ranging problems in national security, counter-terrorism,
search-and-rescue, biology and others. Summaries of the literature on search games for an immobile
Hider can be found in Alpern and Gal (2003), Gal (2011) and Hohzaki (2016).
In many such games, it is possible to exploit the structure of the game in order to solve the
game (that is, find optimal strategies and the value) or find bounds on the value. An example
of this is the classic search game for an immobile Hider on a network studied in Gal (1979) and
Gal (2000). More recent examples can be found in Alpern (2016), Alpern and Lidbetter (2015,
2013a,b), Angelopoulos et al. (2016), Baston and Kikuta (2013, 2015), Fokkink et al. (2016a) and
Lin and Singham (2016). Many of these games are infinite, in the sense that one or both of the
players has a strategy set of infinite cardinality, but in this paper we restrict ourselves to finite
games, which lend themselves better to an algorithmic approach.
Exploiting the structure of the game may not be possible in some games, or it may limit what
can be achieved. However, in some games it may be possible to efficiently solve the one-sided
problem of finding an optimal best response of Player II for any given mixed strategy of Player I:
that is, finding a pure strategy for Player II which has minimal expected payoff against the given
mixed strategy of Player I. We will refer to this problem as the best response problem. In this paper
we study games for which there exists an oracle that can efficiently solve the best response problem.
More generally, we consider games such that there is an oracle that, for any mixed strategy of Player
I, can find a pure strategy for Player II that ensures the payoff is no more than α times the best
response payoff. We call such an oracle an α-approximate best response oracle. So if α = 1, then
an α-approximate best response oracle finds best responses; in this case we simply call it a best
response oracle.
We show that for games with an α-approximate best response oracle, there are efficient al-
gorithms for finding α-optimal strategies for both players. By this we mean a mixed strategy for
Player I that guarantees a payoff of at least V ∗/α and a mixed strategy for Player II that guarantees
a payoff of at most αV ∗, where V ∗ is the value of the game.
Some of our analysis relies on previous work, as explained in Subsection 1.2, and our main
contribution is the wide range of applications to the field of search games, detailed in Section 5.
The examples we give include known search games with known solutions, known search games with
unknown solutions and new search games, all of which can be efficiently solved, either exactly or
approximately, using our algorithms. We hope that by giving these techniques more prominence,
they might be used by others for the purpose of solving search games, or indeed games in other
fields.
We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach experimentally by applying our main algorithm
for computing optimal strategies (presented in Section 4) to the game described in Subsection 1.1.
We show it performs favorably relative to a comparable algorithm of Freund and Schapire (1999,
1996).
1.1 Example: Searching in Boxes
Before describing our algorithms in detail, we illustrate the type of game we will consider with an
example of a search game that is easy to state, and that has the characteristics of the type of games
to which our results can be applied. Although its solution is already known, it is a fundamental
game and provides a good introduction to the more complex games we will discuss in Section 5.
An item (for example an explosive device) is hidden in one of n boxes with costs c1, . . . , cn, so
that the Hider’s strategy set is the set of boxes, [n] = {1, . . . , n}. A pure strategy for the Searcher
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is simply an ordering of the boxes, so the Searcher’s strategy set is the set of all permutations
pi : [n]→ [n]. In other words, pi(j) is the jth location to be inspected. Clearly the Hider’s strategy
set has size n and the Searcher’s strategy set has size n!. For given strategies j of the Hider and
pi of the Searcher, the payoff C(j, pi) of the game, which we call the search cost is the sum of the
costs of all the boxes in the ordering up to and including the box that contains the hidden object.
That is,
C(j, pi) =
∑
i≤pi−1(j)
cpi(i).
We call this game BOX. The solution of BOX is already known in closed form. The Hider’s optimal
strategy is to choose box j with probability proportional to cj as shown in Alpern and Lidbetter
(2013b), where it was also proved that this is the unique optimal strategy. The Searcher does not
have a unique optimal strategy, but three different optimal strategies can be found in Alpern and Lidbetter
(2013b), Lidbetter (2013) and (implicitly) in Condon et al. (2009). The value of the game is also
given in closed form (in two different ways) in Alpern and Lidbetter (2013b) and Lidbetter (2013).
It is somewhat surprising, given the simplicity with which the game can be described, that prior
to these publications the game had not been solved, to the best of our knowledge.
We now show that one could alternatively find optimal strategies in this game by applying our
algorithms. To do this, we must show that there is a best response oracle. This is the problem of
finding a permutation pi that minimizes C(x, pi) for a given Hider mixed strategy x. It is a classic
search problem solved by Blackwell, reported in Matula (1964). In fact, Blackwell solved a more
general problem, which we describe later in Subsection 5.7. For this version of the problem, the
solution is to search the boxes in non-increasing order of the index xj/cj .
We can arrive at the solution in another way, taken from the scheduling literature. Consider
the problem of scheduling n jobs with processing times tj and weights wj, that correspond to the
relative importance of the jobs. The object is to determine the schedule that orders the jobs in
such a way as to minimize the weighted sum of the completion times. This problem is usually
denoted 1||
∑
wjCj in the scheduling literature, and has the well known solution, given by Smith
(1956), of scheduling the jobs in non-decreasing order of the ratio tj/wj . Of course, viewing the
costs cj in the best response problem for BOX as processing times, and viewing the probabilities
xj as weights, these two problems and their solutions are equivalent.
We could also consider the more general box searching game introduced and solved by Lidbetter
(2013) of searching for k ≥ 1 objects hidden in n boxes. However, in this case our approach cannot
be used to solve the game, since the solution of the best response problem is not known. In fact,
the computational complexity of this problem is unknown, even for k = 2, and we view this as an
interesting open problem. More precisely, suppose two items are hidden in n boxes with search
costs according to a known distribution, so that the probability they are in boxes i and j is some
pij, for i ≤ j. What ordering of the boxes minimizes the total expected cost of finding both objects?
1.2 Overview of Paper
We take two approaches to using an α-approximate best response oracle to find approximate solu-
tions to games. In Section 3, we present an algorithm using an existing ellipsoid approach from the
approximation algorithms literature. This approach uses the ellipsoid algorithm with an approxi-
mate separation oracle to achieve approximately optimal solutions to an LP and to its dual. The
approach was previously used in work on solving generic LPs, and was used to develop approxima-
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tion algorithms for a number of different combinatorial optimization problems, including routing,
scheduling, and graph coloring (Jansen (2003), Carr and Vempala (2002), Friggstad and Swamy
(2012) and Feldman et al. (2012)). However, while the ellipsoid algorithm is theoretically impor-
tant as the first polynomial time algorithm for solving LPs, it is extremely slow and is not used in
practice. Thus we include our algorithm from Section 3 for theoretical interest only.
In Section 4 we use a multiplicative weights update approach: a good general survey of this
method can be found in Arora et al. (2012). Approximately 20 years ago, Freund and Schapire
(1999, 1996) gave a multiplicative update algorithm that computes near-optimal strategies for two-
player zero-sum games. Their algorithm yields strategies with payoffs that are within an additive
ε of the game value V . Specifically, the strategy for Player I guarantees an expected payoff of at
least V − ε, and the strategy for Player II guarantees an expected payoff of at most V + ε. The
algorithm assumes that the payoffs are in the interval [0, 1], so ε represents a fraction of the range
[0, 1] of payoffs.
Surprisingly, the approach of Freund and Schapire does not seem to have been extended to
yield multiplicative approximations: that is, strategies that guarantee an expected payoff within
a multiplicative factor (1 + ε) of the value. Multiplicative approximations are more common in
the literature on approximation algorithms. It is also easy to show that for small ε, our notion
of (1 + ε)-optimal is equivalent to the notion of a relative ε-approximate Nash equilibrium from
Daskalakis (2013), in the case of zero-sum games (see the Appendix).
In Section 4, we obtain (1+ε)-optimal strategies. We use a multiplicative update rule of Garg and Ko¨nemann
(2007), and we rely somewhat on their analysis, though their work does not automatically imply
the existence of approximately optimal strategies for Player I. We therefore combine this with a
variation of the analysis of Freund and Schapire (1999) as presented by Arora et al. (2012). We
make some changes, due to the form of our multiplicative approximation factor, and the fact that
our algorithm is designed to accommodate an approximate best response oracle. However, our
primary contribution is a bringing together of ideas resulting in what we believe is the first self-
contained exposition of an algorithm and its analysis for computing multiplicative approximations
of optimal strategies in a zero-sum game.
We then apply our algorithms to a variety of games in Section 5.
In Section 6 we describe the results of experiments we performed, in which we compare our
multiplicative weights algorithm and the multiplicative weights algorithm of Freund and Schapire
(1999) on the game BOX.
2 Preliminaries
In what follows, we consider a zero-sum game between a maximizing Player I with n pure strategies
and a minimizing Player II with a number of strategies that that could be as large as 2p(n), for
some polynomial p. The payoff function is C and all the payoffs are positive. We assume there is
an α-approximate best response oracle, for some constant α ≥ 1. That is, there is a polynomial
time algorithm (polynomial in n) which, for any given mixed strategy x of Player I, computes a
pure strategy jα(x) such that C(x, jα(x)) ≤ αminiC(x, i). In other words, the oracle computes a
pure strategy for Player II whose payoff against x is within a factor α of the payoff given by Player
II’s best response.
Let V ∗ be the value of the game. We say that a strategy xˆ for Player I is α-optimal if C(xˆ,y) ≥
V ∗/α for any strategy y of Player II. We say a strategy for Player II is α-optimal if C(x, yˆ) ≤ αV ∗
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for any strategy x of Player I.
We assume that mixed strategies x and y for the two players are represented in sparse form,
as a list containing the index of each non-zero entry, together with its value. This is especially
important for y, as the number of pure strategies for Player II may not be polynomial in n, and
we want the running time to depend polynomially on n.
Let A denote the game matrix, so that A[i, j] = C(i, j). We assume an oracle for computing
A[i, j]. That is, we assume there is a polynomial-time algorithm (polynomial in n) that takes as
input (representations of) pure strategies i and j of Players I and II, and outputs A[i, j].
3 Ellipsoid Approach
Let µ = maxi,j A[i, j] be the largest entry in the game matrix. We assume this quantity is given
as part of the input, or that it can be computed in time polynomial in n. In fact, it is sufficient to
compute an upper bound µ that is polynomial in maxi,j A[i, j] and n. We assume in this section
that the payoffs are integers, since the standard bounds on the runtime of the ellipsoid algorithm
assume that the input LP has integer coefficients.
Consider the standard LP representing the problem of finding an optimal strategy for Player I.
LPI: Maximize V
such that
(1)
∑
i xiA[i, j] ≥ V for all j
(2)
∑
i xi = 1
(3) xi ≥ 0 for all i
A separation oracle for LPI takes as input an assignment to the variables of the LP, and either
reports that it is a feasible solution, or returns a hyperplane separating the assignment from the
feasible region. If we had a separation oracle for LPI, we could use the ellipsoid algorithm to obtain
an optimal strategy for Player I.
Although we do not have such an oracle, we can use the α-approximate best response oracle as
an approximate separation oracle for LPI. A query to a separation oracle for LPI corresponds to a
pair < x, V >, where the first element is the assignment to the xi and the second is the assignment
to V . We can answer query < x, V >, approximately, using the following procedure:
1. Check if a constraint of type (2) or (3) of LPI is violated by assignment < x, V >. If so,
return such a violated constraint (separating hyperplane) as the answer to the query and exit.
2. Otherwise, x corresponds to a mixed strategy of Player I. Query the α-approximate best
response oracle on x. Let j∗ = jα(x) be the returned strategy for Player II.
3. Check whether
∑
i xiA(i, j
∗) ≥ V is satisfied by the queried assignment < x, V >.
4. If not, return the violated constraint
∑
i xiA(i, j
∗) ≥ V as the answer to the query. Otherwise,
answer the query by reporting (possibly incorrectly) that < x, V > is a feasible solution.
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Note that in the last step < x, V > may be returned, even though it is not necessarily feasible.
However, in this case < x, V/α > is feasible, because j∗ was returned by the α-approximate best
response oracle.
With this approximate separation oracle, we can apply the ellipsoid approach from the approx-
imation algorithms literature, referenced above in Section 1.2. (In fact, Feldman et al. (2012) uses
a minor variant of the approach that yields a somewhat smaller restricted dual LP. For simplicity
of presentation, we do not discuss this variant here.)
It yields an algorithm that computes α-optimal strategies for Players I and II. The algorithm
makes use of the dual of LPI, which computes an optimal strategy for Player II. We present the
dual LP as LPII.
LPII: Minimize V
such that
(1)
∑
j yjA[i, j] ≤ V for all i
(2)
∑
j yj = 1
(3) yj ≥ 0 for all j
The algorithm is as follows. To compute an α-approximate strategy for Player I, run the ellipsoid
algorithm using the approximate separation oracle for LPI described above. Let S be the set of
violated constraints returned by the oracle. Let xˆ denote the strategy that is returned. Return it
as the α-optimal strategy for Player I.
Let S′ be the set of variables yj in LPII, corresponding to the constraints in S. Let LPIIRestrict
denote the restriction of LPII that is produced by setting all yj 6∈ S
′ to 0. Generate LPIIRestrict
explicitly, computing A[i, j] for all j ∈ S′ and for all i, to obtain the constraints. Solve this LP using
a standard polynomial-time LP algorithm, such as the ellipsoid algorithm, to obtain an optimal
solution yˆ for LPIIRestrict. Return yˆ as the strategy for Player II.
This algorithm is the basis for the following theorem. In the proof, we provide the analysis of
the algorithm for the benefit of the reader; the analysis is essentially the same as that presented
by Jansen (2003) for solving general LPs and their duals.
Theorem 1 Let V ∗ be the value of the game. There exists an algorithm that computes strategies
xˆ and yˆ for Players I and II such that
C(x, yˆ) ≤ αV ∗ for any strategy x of Player I and
C(xˆ,y) ≥
V ∗
α
for any strategy y of Player II.
This algorithm, which uses the ellipsoid algorithm, runs in time polynomial in n and lnµ, where µ
is the largest entry in the game matrix.
Proof: The algorithm presented above computes the strategies xˆ and yˆ. We now prove that xˆ
and yˆ are α-optimal strategies for Players I and II respectively. To show that xˆ is an α-optimal
strategy for Player I, let LPI(v) denote the feasibility problem for the set of constraints of LPI,
with V = v. Let P (v) = {x | x is a feasible solution to LPI(v)}. First consider what happens if you
run the ellipsoid algorithm using an exact separation oracle for LPI. It performs a binary search on
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the values in an interval I := {0, γ, 2γ, . . . , µ}, where γ and 1/γ is polymomial in n and lnµ. The
optimal value of LPI is guaranteed to be a value in I. During the binary search, for each tested
value v in I, the ellipsoid algorithm makes a sequence Qv of queries < x, V > to the separation
oracle, where in each query, V = v. The querying continues until either (a) the separation oracle
returns the queried assignment < x, v > (indicating that x ∈ P (v)) or (b) the set of violated
constraints returned by the separation oracle, in answer to the queries in Qv, implies that P (v) = ∅
(because there is no assignment satisfying all constraints in that set). The binary search finds the
largest value of v ∈ I for which P (v) 6= ∅. The ellipsoid algorithm then returns this largest value
v, along with the associated x ∈ LPI(v), as the optimal solution to LPI.
Now consider what happens when the ellipsoid algorithm is instead run with the approximate
separation oracle described above. Recall that V ∗ is the optimal value of LPI. The binary search
is run, and ends by returning a final value of v, with an associated assignment x. Let vf denote
this final value, and let xˆ be the associated assignment. By the properties of the approximate
separation oracle, and the behavior of binary search, xˆ ∈ P (vf/α) and P (vf + γ) = ∅. Because
P (vf + γ) = ∅,
vf ≥ V ∗. (1)
Further, because xˆ ∈ P (vf/α), it follows that for all strategies y of Player II,
C(xˆ,y) ≥ vf/α, (2)
and hence from (1),
C(xˆ,y) ≥ V ∗/α (3)
for all strategies y of Player II. Thus xˆ is an α-optimal strategy for Player I.
By the well-known results in Grotschel et al. (1988) on the runtime of the ellipsoid algorithm,
the above computation of xˆ takes time polynomial in n and lnµ.
The proof that yˆ is an α-approximate strategy for Player II is as follows. Let V R denote the
optimal value of LPIIRestrict. Since yˆ is an optimal solution to LPIIRestrict,
C(x, yˆ) ≤ V R (4)
for all strategies x of Player I.
Because xˆ ∈ P (vf/α),
vf/α ≤ V ∗. (5)
Since LPII is dual to LPI, the optimal value of LPII is also V ∗.
Let LPIRelax denote the dual of LPIIRestrict obtained from LPI by removing the constraints∑
i xiA[i, j] ≥ V for j 6∈ S
′. By duality, V R is also the optimal value for LPIRelax. The violated
constraints returned when running the ellipsoid algorithm with the approximate separation oracle
for LPI are also violated constraints of LPIRelax. Therefore, the answers given by the approximate
separation oracle for LPI could also have been given for LPIRelax. Since the execution of the
ellipsoid algorithm depends entirely on the answers to the separation oracle queries, and not on
other properties of the LP, it follows by the same argument used to prove (1) that
vf ≥ V R. (6)
Combining that with (5), we get V R ≤ αV ∗. From (4), it immediately follows that yˆ is an α-optimal
strategy for Player II.
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Because the computation of xˆ takes time polynomial in n and lnµ, the number of constraints in
LPIIRestrict is polynomial in those parameters. It follows that computing yˆ takes time polynomial
in those quantities. 
4 Multiplicative Weights Approach
We now present an alternative approach to solving (or approximately solving) games using an α-
approximate best response oracle. This approach is more “combinatorial” in nature, in the sense
that it does not depend on the values of the payoffs in the same way as the approach of Section 3.
Our algorithm takes the same high level approach as the algorithm of Freund and Schapire
(1999), which finds strategies that approximate the optimal strategies within an additive ε. Player
I begins with a uniformly random strategy. Player I then repeatedly plays mixed strategies, to
which Player II replies with best responses. In each round, Player I updates her strategy, using
some multiplicative update rule based on the best response of Player II. The more successful the
pure strategy is (that is, the higher payoff it achieves), the more weight Player I gives it in the next
round.
The algorithm is based on a simple observation: finding optimal strategies for Player II is
easily reducible to the problem of solving a Packing LP. An approximately optimal solution to the
latter problem is given by a multiplicative weights update algorithm, due to Garg and Ko¨nemann
(2007). Our algorithm uses essentially the same update rule, and we also rely on part of their
analysis to show that this gives an approximately optimal solution for Player II. We show how the
multiplicative weights update algorithm also yields an approximately optimal strategy for Player
I. We believe the strategy for Player I to be an original contribution, which does not immediately
follow from the analysis of Garg and Ko¨nemann (2007).
The relation between our games and packing LPs is as follows. A packing LP is a linear program
of the form max{cTy | Ay ≤ b,y ≥ 0} where A,b, and c all have positive entries. If A is the
payoff matrix of a two-player zero-sum game, bT = (1, . . . , 1), cT = (1, . . . , 1), and y∗ is the optimal
solution to the LP, it is easy to show that the strategy that chooses each column j with probability
proportional to y∗j is an optimal strategy for the Player II. Thus one can reduce the problem of
computing an optimal strategy for Player II to the problem of solving the packing LP. Because the
reduction is so simple (just a scaling of the variables), we integrate it into our algorithm, rather
than performing it explicitly as a separate step. We note that a special case of this reduction
was exploited previously by Condon et al. (2009) in the solution of a variant of the game BOX.
However, the resulting specialized packing LP was then solved by different methods.
We first describe our algorithm in detail, then give a bound on the run time, and finally prove
that it works.
Fix η > 0 and δ > 0 (we will specify their values later) and let x(1) be the mixed strategy for
Player I given by x
(1)
i = 1/n for all i.
1. Set t = 1.
2. Use the α-approximate best response oracle to compute j(t) = jα(x
(t)).
3. Set M (t) = maxiC(i, j
(t)). (Positive payoffs guarantee that 1/M (t) is well defined.)
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4. Define x
(t+1)
i =
(
1+ηC(i,j(t))/M (t)
1+ηC(x(t),j(t))/M (t)
)
x
(t)
i for all i. (The expression in the denominator is a
normalizing factor to ensure that x(t+1) is a mixed strategy.)
5. If f(t) :=
∏
t′≤t
(
1 + ηC(x(t
′), j(t
′))/M (t
′)
)
> 1/(δn), then set T = t and stop. Else increase
t by 1 and return to Step 2.
Let yˆ be the mixed strategy that chooses pure strategy j(t) with probability proportional to
1/M (t). More precisely, yˆj is proportional to
∑
{t:j(t)=j} 1/M
(t). Let tˆ be the value of t that
maximizes C(x(t), j(t)) and let xˆ = x(tˆ). We will later show that these strategies xˆ and yˆ are
approximately optimal.
The proof of the following lemma is from Garg and Ko¨nemann (2007) (following the presentation
in Liu et al. (2008)).
Lemma 1 The number of iterations T of the algorithm satisfies
T ≤ n
(
1−
ln δ
ln(1 + η)
)
. (7)
Proof: For i = 1, . . . , n, let z
(1)
i = δ and for t ≥ 2 let z
(t) = δnf(t− 1)x(t). It follows that
z
(t+1)
i = (1 + ηC(i, j
(t))/M (t))z
(t)
i . (8)
Note that the stopping condition f(t) > 1/(δn) is equivalent to the condition
∑
i z
(t+1)
i > 1, since
∑
i
z
(t+1)
i =
∑
i
δnf(t)x
(t+1)
i = δnf(t).
Therefore, since the algorithm terminates on the T th iteration, we must have
∑
i z
(T )
i ≤ 1 and∑
i z
(T+1)
i > 1.
In each iteration of the algorithm, there is some pure strategy i for Player I such that C(i, j(t)) =
M (t). Call such a strategy a bottleneck strategy. If i is a bottleneck strategy in iteration t then
z
(t+1)
i = (1+ η)z
(t)
i , so if i is a bottleneck strategy a total of m times then z
(T+1)
i ≥ δ(1 + η)
m. But
also z
(T+1)
i ≤ 1 + η, since otherwise z
(T )
i > 1, contradicting
∑
i z
(T )
i ≤ 1. Putting together these
inequalities,
δ(1 + η)m ≤ z
(T+1)
i ≤ 1 + η, so
m ≤ 1−
ln δ
ln(1 + η)
.
Inequality (7) follows from the fact that Player I has n pure strategies and in each iteration at least
one of them is a bottleneck strategy. 
We now prove that for an appropriate choice of the parameters δ and η, the strategies produced
by the algorithm are approximately optimal and that the total runtime is not too large.
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Theorem 2 Let V ∗ be the value of the game. For any ε > 0, there exist algorithms that compute
strategies xˆ and yˆ for Player I and II such that
C(x, yˆ) ≤ α(1 + ε)V ∗ for any strategy x of Player I and
C(xˆ,y) ≥
V ∗
α(1 + ε)
for any strategy y of Player II.
The algorithm that computes yˆ runs in time polynomial in n and 1/ε; the algorithm that computes
xˆ runs in time polynomial in n, 1/ε and α.
Proof: For each i, we have
x
(T+1)
i =

∏
t≤T
1 + ηC(i, j(t))/M (t)
1 + ηC(x(t), j(t))/M (t)

x(1)i =

∏
t≤T
1 + ηC(i, j(t))/M (t)
1 + ηC(x(t), j(t))/M (t)

 1
n
.
Since every coordinate of x(T+1) is at most 1, we have
n ≥ nx
(T+1)
i =
∏
t≤T 1 + ηC(i, j
(t))/M (t)∏
t≤T 1 + ηC(x
(t), j(t))/M (t)
≥
(1 + η)
∑
t≤T C(i,j
(t))/M (t)
exp(η
∑
t≤T C(x
(t), j(t))/M (t)))
(9)
The second inequality above follows from the facts that
(1 + ηz) ≥ (1 + η)z for z ∈ [0, 1],
and
(1 + z) ≤ exp(z) for all z.
Taking natural logarithms in (9), we get
lnn ≥ ln(1 + η)
∑
t≤T
C(i, j(t))/M (t) − η
∑
t≤T
C(x(t), j(t))/M (t).
Now we use the fact that ln(1 + η) ≥ η − η2 and rearrange:
∑
t≤T
C(x(t), j(t))/M (t) ≥ −
lnn
η
+ (1− η)
∑
t≤T
C(i, j(t))/M (t).
By the linearity of the cost function and the right-hand side, the inequality above is still true if we
replace the terms C(i, j(t)) by C(x, j(t)), where x is any arbitrary strategy for Player I. Combining
this with the fact that C(x(t), j(t)) ≤ αV ∗, we get
αV ∗
∑
t≤T
1/M (t) ≥
∑
t≤T
C(x(t), j(t))/M (t) ≥ −
lnn
η
+ (1− η)
∑
t≤T
C(x, j(t))/M (t). (10)
By definition of yˆ,
C(x, yˆ) =
∑
t≤T C(x, j
(t))/M (t)∑
t≤T 1/M
(t)
,
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and substituting this into (10) and rearranging gives
αV ∗ ≥ −
lnn
η
∑
t≤T 1/M
(t)
+ (1− η)C(x, yˆ). (11)
By the stopping condition, f(T ) > 1/(δn), so
1
δn
<
∏
t≤T
(
1 + ηC(x(t), j(t))/M (t)
)
≤
∏
t≤T
(
1 + ηαV ∗/M (t)
)
(by definition of j(t))
≤ exp

∑
t≤T
ηαV ∗/M (t)

 , so taking logs and rearranging,
∑
t≤T
1
M (t)
≥ −
ln(nδ)
ηαV ∗
. (12)
We will see later than nδ < 1, so that ln(nδ) is negative. Combining (12) with (11) gives
C(x, yˆ) ≤
αV ∗
(1− η) (1 + lnn/ ln δ)
. (13)
Let η = η0 = ((1 + ε)
1/2 − 1)/2 and let δ = n−1/η, and use (1− η)−1 ≤ (1 + 2η) to get
C(x, yˆ) ≤
αV ∗
(1− η)2
≤ (1 + 2η)2αV ∗ = α(1 + ε)V ∗.
With these choices of η and δ, by Lemma 1, the number of iterations T of the algorithm satisfies
T ≤ n
(
1 +
(1/η) ln n
ln(1 + η)
)
≤ n
(
1 + (1/η + 1/η2) lnn
)
(using ln(1 + η) ≥ η/(1 + η))
≤ n(1 + (8/ε + 8/ε2) ln n) (since η ≥ ε/8).
This is clearly polynomial in n and 1/ε.
We now turn to Player I’s strategy xˆ. We will choose different, smaller values for both η and
δ (to be specified later), giving a longer runtime for computing xˆ that is polynomial in n, 1/ε and
α. If we wish to calculate both strategies we could either run the algorithm twice using the two
different choices of η and δ, or simply run the algorithm once using the second choice. This would
give Players II’s strategy as well as Player I’s since the right-hand side of (13) is increasing in δ
and ε.
First let x∗ be an optimal strategy of Player I. Then C(x∗, j(t)) ≥ V ∗ because x∗ is optimal.
Hence, substituting x = x∗ into (10),
∑
t≤T
C(x(t), j(t))/M (t) ≥ −
lnn
η
+ (1− η)
∑
t≤T
C(x∗, j(t))/M (t) ≥ −
lnn
η
+ (1− η)V ∗
∑
t≤T
1/M (t).
(14)
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By definition of j(t), we have C(xˆ, j(tˆ)) ≤ αC(xˆ,y) for any strategy y so
C(xˆ,y) ≥
1
α
C(xˆ, j(tˆ))
≥
1
α
∑
t≤T 1/M
(t)
∑
t≤T
C(x(t), j(t))/M (t) (by definition of tˆ)
≥
− lnn/η
α
∑
t≤T 1/M
(t)
+
(1− η)V ∗
α
(by (14))
≥
V ∗ lnn
ln(nδ)
+
(1− η)V ∗
α
(by (12))
=
V ∗
α
(
1− η +
α lnn
ln(nδ)
)
.
Again, take η = η0 and this time take δ = δ0 = n
−1−α/η, so that
C(xˆ,y) ≥
V ∗
α
(1− 2η) ≥
V ∗
α(1 + 2η)2
=
V ∗
α(1 + ε)
.
For these values of η and δ, the bound on the runtime given by Lemma 1 is
T ≤ n
(
1 +
(1 + α/η) ln n
ln(1 + η)
)
≤ n
(
1 + (1/η + 1/η2)(α+ η) ln n
)
≤ n(1 + (8/ε + 8/ε2)(α+ ε) ln n) (again using η ≥ ε/8 and also η ≤ ε).
This time T is polynomial in n, 1/ε and α. 
We note that our algorithm uses O( α
ε2
(n lnn)) rounds of updates, while the algorithm of
Freund and Schapire (1996) (which finds strategies within an additive ε of optimal) has only a
logarithmic dependence of n. In fact, a multiplicative approximation factor of (1 + ε) cannot be
achieved in o(n)/εk rounds of a multiplicative update algorithm, for any k, as we state in the
following proposition. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Let k, ε > 0. There exist zero-sum games with n strategies for each player, with
positive payoffs, such that Player II has no (1 + ε)-optimal strategy with support of size o(n)/εk.
5 Applications to Search Games
In this section we describe how our algorithms can be applied to several known and new search
games. Each game is played between a Hider, who corresponds to Player I in our theorems, and a
Searcher, who corresponds to Player II. In this section we present several theorems concerning the
existence of polynomial time algorithms for computing optimal or approximately optimal strategies
for search games. These theorems refer to algorithms based on either the ellipsoid approach in
Section 3 or the multiplicative weights approach in Section 4.
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5.1 Searching in Boxes with Precedence Constraints
We begin with a generalization of the game BOX discussed in Subsection 1.1. In particular,
we restrict the Searcher only to orderings that are consistent with some predefined precedence
constraints on the boxes. That is, we suppose that there is a partial order ≺ on the boxes so that
box i can be searched before box j 6= i if and only if i ≺ j. The Hider’s strategy set and the payoff
function remain unchanged. We call this game PREC, and while it has not been studied before in
the form we define it in here, a more general version of it was studied in Fokkink et al (2016b), as
we will discuss in the next subsection.
In order to apply our algorithms to PREC we must consider the best response problem of choos-
ing the search that minimizes the expected search cost for a given Hider distribution x. Similarly as
for BOX, we can reframe this problem as the scheduling problem of finding a precedence-constrained
ordering of a set of jobs with processing times and weights to minimize the sum of the weighted
completion times. This problem is usually denoted 1|prec|
∑
wjCj in the scheduling literature. It
is well known to be NP-hard, and many 2-approximation algorithms can be found, for instance
Chekuri et al. (1999) and Schulz (1996). These algorithms can be used as a 2-approximate best
response oracle, so we obtain our first new result for search games.
Theorem 3 There exist polynomial time algorithms that compute 2-approximate strategies for both
players in PREC.
5.2 The Submodular Search Game
This game was introduced by Fokkink et al. (2016a), and further studied by Fokkink et al (2016b).
As in the game, BOX, the Hider’s strategy set is [n] and the Searcher’s strategy set is all permu-
tations pi of [n]. The difference is in the payoff function. Let f : S → R+ be a non-decreasing
submodular set function on S, which corresponds to the cost of searching subsets of S. For a given
hiding location j and a given permutation pi, the payoff C(j, pi) of the game is defined as the cost
of the set of locations searched up to and including j. That is,
C(j, pi) = f({i : i ≤ pi−1(j)}).
We call this game SUB. It is a further generalization of PREC. This can be seen by defining a cost
function f on subsets S of [n] in PREC such that f(S) is the cost of all the elements of [n] in the
precedence-closure of S. Then, under this cost function, optimal strategies for SUB will correspond
to optimal strategies in PREC.
Fokkink et al (2016b) also consider the best response problem for SUB, and they prove that
this problem can be solved approximately, within a factor of 2, generalizing the analogous result
in the scheduling literature. It follows that our algorithms can be used to calculate 2-approximate
strategies for the players in SUB, and so we obtain our next new result for search games.
Theorem 4 There exist polynomial time algorithms that calculate 2-approximate strategies for both
players in SUB.
5.3 Expanding Search
In PREC, the partial order ≺ on [n] uniquely defines a directed acyclic graph, and if that graph is a
tree then PREC is equivalent to the expanding search game on a tree, introduced in Alpern and Lidbetter
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(2013b). The game, which we will call EXP, can be played on any undirected graph with a dis-
tinguished vertex called the root and edges with costs corresponding to the time taken to traverse
them. A pure strategy for the Hider is a vertex at which to hide, and a pure strategy for the
Searcher is a sequence of edges, the first of which is incident to the root, and each other of which
must be adjacent to a previously chosen edge, not necessarily the most recently chosen edge. This
type of search on a graph is called an expanding search. The payoff is the search cost, which is
the sum of the costs of the edges chosen by the Searcher up to and including the first edge that
is incident to the Hider’s chosen vertex. See Alpern and Lidbetter (2013b) for motivations and
applications of expanding search.
For EXP played on a tree, the best response problem is what Alpern and Lidbetter (2013b) call
the Bayesian problem of finding a search that minimizes the expected payoff for a known hiding
distribution on the vertices of the tree, and the authors give a solution to this problem. The
solution to the equivalent scheduling problem 1|prec|
∑
wjCj for tree-like precedence constraints
is also known, and can be solved using the so-called Sidney decomposition proposed by Sidney
(1975). Therefore, our algorithms can be applied to find optimal strategies for the players in
the game. However, optimal strategies have already been found in closed form for this game in
Alpern and Lidbetter (2013b).
If we consider EXP on a more general graph, then the best response problem can be shown
to be NP-hard (Du¨rr (2016)). Whether the problem can be efficiently approximated is an open
question. If this were the case then our results would imply that approximately optimal strategies
for EXP could also be found.
5.4 Expanding Search Ratio
This is a game that was introduced by Angelopoulos et al. (2016). The game is played on a graph
with n vertices plus a root vertex and edges with costs. The Hider chooses one of the n non-root
vertices of the tree and the Searcher chooses an expanding search, as in the expanding search game
considered in Alpern and Lidbetter (2013b). However, for a given vertex v and a given expanding
search, the payoff is not the search cost, but the ratio of the search cost to the shortest path
distance d(v) from the root to v. This payoff is called the search ratio. It is a measure of the
“regret” incurred by the Searcher in finding the Hider, and so we call the game EXPr.
Angelopoulos et al. (2016) find a 5/4-optimal strategy for the Searcher in EXPr for star graphs,
which is generalized in Angelopoulos et al. (2017) to general unweighted graphs (where all the edges
have equal cost) and tree graphs. Independently, Condon et al. (2009) have studied the same game
for star graphs in the context of throughput maximization, and they give a full solution. But the
solution of EXPr for any other class of graphs is unknown.
Consider EXPr played on a tree graph, and we will show that in this case, the best response
problem can be solved in polynomial time. Indeed, suppose the Hider is located at vertex v
with probability p(v). Let x(v) = p(v)/d(v) and let xˆ be the normalization of x, so that xˆ is a
probability vector. Then the best response problem is the problem of finding the expanding search
that minimizes the expected search ratio with respect to p, which is clearly equivalent to the
problem of finding the expanding search that minimizes the expected search time with respect to
xˆ. The latter problem is the best response problem for EXP, which, as discussed in Subsection 5.3,
can be solved in polynomial time. Therefore we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5 There exist polynomial time algorithms that calculate optimal strategies for both play-
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ers in EXPr played on a tree.
For other types of graphs, using our results depends on finding approximations to the best
response problem for EXP.
5.5 Search Games with Regret
The payoff matrix of the game EXPr discussed in the previous subsection, can be obtained from
the payoff matrix of the game EXP by dividing each row of the matrix by a constant, which is
equal to the shortest path distance to the vertex corresponding to that row. If we take any search
game, we can define a “regret version” of that game by dividing the row corresponding to each
Hider pure strategy j by some constant. There is usually a natural choice of constant, for example
in SUB, we might divide the row corresponding to Hider strategy j by f({j}), the cost that would
be incurred by the Searcher if she knew where the Hider was (provided f({j}) > 0 for all j).
If there is an α-approximate best response oracle for some search game, then it follows that
there is also an α-approximate best response oracle for any regret version of that game, using
similar reasoning as in Subsection 5.4. This implies, using our results, that we can find α-optimal
strategies in both games. So, for instance, we immediately find that for the regret version of SUB,
there is an efficient algorithm that finds 2-approximate strategies.
We sum this up below.
Theorem 6 Suppose there is an α-approximate best response oracle for some game we call GAME
with payoff function C. Let GAMEr be the game defined by the payoff function C ′(i, j) := kiC(i, j),
where k1, . . . , kn are non-negative constants. Then there is an α-approximate best response oracle
for GAMEr, and hence there exist polynomial time algorithms for calculating α-optimal strategies.
5.6 Hide-Seek and Pursuit-Evasion
We now discuss a different type of game, introduced by Gal and Casas (2014) in the context of
predator-prey interaction, though the game could equally apply to problems of national security
such as the pursuit of a terrorist. As in the games discussed above, a Hider or hidden object is
located in one of n locations (this time without search costs). The Searcher can search a subset of
locations size at most k, for some given k, and if the Hider’s location j lies in this set, a pursuit
ensues and the Searcher captures him with probability pj . The payoff of the game, which the Hider
wishes to minimize and the Searcher to maximize, is the probability that the Hider is captured.
Gal and Casas (2014) provide a closed form solution to this game.
Here we introduce a generalization of this game, in which the locations have search costs cj . A
pure strategy for the Searcher is a subset of locations, the sum of whose search costs does not exceed
k. The payoff, as before, is the probability the Hider is captured. We call this game HSPE (hide-
seek and pursuit-evasion). If all the locations’ costs are equal to 1, then HSPE is equivalent to the
original game of Gal and Casas (2014). Consider the best response problem, where the probability
xj that the Hider is in location j, j = 1, . . . , n is known and the problem is to choose a subset
of locations that maximizes the probability of capture. Let wj = pjxj. Then the problem is to
choose a subset S of [n] of total cost c(S) :=
∑
j∈S cj at most k, that maximizes w(S) :=
∑
j∈S wj .
This is the classic Knapsack problem, which has a fully polynomial time approximation scheme
(see Vazirani (2013)). That is, given ε > 0, there exists an algorithm that is polynomial in n and
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1/ε that approximates the solution of the knapsack problem within a multiplicative factor of 1+ ε.
This implies the following.
Theorem 7 The problem of finding optimal strategies in the game HSPE has a fully polynomial
time approximation scheme.
5.7 An Infinite Game
We finish this section by discussing an infinite game studied by Lin and Singham (2015), for which
our results do not directly apply because the Searcher has a strategy set of (countably infinite)
cardinality. We are optimistic that our results could be extended to such games in future work,
which is why we mention it here.
In the game of Lin and Singham (2015), a Hider is located in one of n locations with search costs
cj and capture probabilities pj, as in the game, HSPE of the previous subsection. The Searcher
chooses an infinite sequence of locations, and each time the Searcher examines the Hider’s location j,
she finds him independently with probability pj. The payoff of the game is the Searcher’s expected
cost of finding the Hider for the first time.
As Lin and Singham (2015) point out, the solution of the best response problem for this game
is well known. Suppose the Hider is hidden in location j with probability xj . Then, as showed by
Blackwell (reported in Matula (1964)), the optimal policy for the Searcher is, at any time, to choose
a location that maximizes the index xjpj/cj , with the hiding probability xj being updated according
to Bayes’ Law after each search. Of course, because the optimal policy is an infinite sequence, it
cannot necessary be concisely expressed, but an approximately optimal solution may be found,
and Lin and Singham (2015) exploit this fact to give an algorithm which they believe converges to
an optimal search strategy in the game. We leave it for future work to develop a provably fully
polynomial approximation scheme for the problems of determining optimal strategies in the game.
6 Numerical experiments
In this section we test our multiplicative weights algorithm of Section 4 and compare it to the
algorithm of Freund and Schapire (1999). The latter algorithm has the same form as ours, but
updates the weights in each iteration using a different multiplicative factor. It outputs strategies
that ensure an expected payoff of at least V ∗− ε for Player I and at most V ∗+ ε for Player II. The
number of iterations is O( lnn
ε2
), but it assumes the payoffs have been scaled to lie in [0, 1].
In order to compare the Freund and Schapire algorithm to ours, we note that theirs could
be applied directly to obtain a multiplicative approximation, but the resulting number of rounds
would depend on the payoffs of the game. More particularly, consider using their algorithm to
find a strategy for Player II that is within a multiplicative factor 1 + ε of optimal. This requires
scaling the payoffs to be in [0, 1], which can be done by dividing them by µ, the maximum entry in
the payoff matrix. Achieving a multiplicative approximation of 1 + ε is equivalent to achieving an
additive approximation of εV ∗/µ, relative to the scaled values. For Player I, achieving a optimal
strategy that is within a multiplicative factor of 1 + ε of optimal means guaranteeing a payoff of
at least 1/(1 + ε) times the value of the game. Thus achieving this approximation for Player I
is equivalent to achieving an additive payoff of at least 1 − ε′ relative to the scaled values, where
ε′ = ε/(1 + ε) · V ∗/µ. However, we do not know the value of V ∗, so in order to calculate the
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appropriate additive approximation, we have to use a lower boundm for V ∗. Thus, a multiplicative
approximation of 1 + ε is best compared to an additive approximate of ε′, where
ε′ =
ε
1 + ε
(
m
µ
)
. (15)
So to ensure the same quality of approximation for both players we should use (15) to calculate
the appropriate additive approximation in the Freund and Schapire algorithm. The simplest choice
for the lower bound m would be the minimum value of any payoff in the game. This yields
O(( µmε )
2(ln n)) iterations, a quantity that depends on the payoffs. If µ/m is constant, this algorithm
requires fewer rounds than ours, asymptotically, but if µ/m is large compared to n it could require
an arbitrarily large number of rounds.
Here we test both our multiplicative weights algorithm and that of Freund and Schapire (as
presented in Arora et al. (2012)) on instances of the game BOX. We randomly generated 40 different
instances of the game, which we grouped into four sets. For Set 1 and Set 2, we took n = 5, and
for Set 3 and Set 4 we took n = 10. The payoffs in Sets 1 and 3 were uniformly chosen at random
to be an integer between 1 and 10, and in Sets 2 and 4 they were chosen uniformly at random
between 1 and 100. The 40 instances of the game BOX can be found in Table 2 in the appendix.
We also considered four different values of ε. In order to fairly compare the two algorithms,
for each value of ε we used for the multiplicative approximate of 1 + ε in our algorithm, we used
ε′ for the Freund and Schapire algorithm, as given in (15). For the lower bound m on the value,
we thought it unfair to take unthinkingly the smallest payoff in the game, and instead took m to
be the largest cost maxi ci of the n boxes. This is a better simple lower bound on the value, which
the Hider can achieve by hiding the object in the highest cost box.
An even better lower bound m could be obtained by using the more sophisticated approach of
taking the best response payoff C(x, j(x)), where x is the uniform strategy xi = 1/n for all i and
j(x) is Player II’s best response to x. Therefore we then ran the Freund and Schapire algorithm a
second time using this choice of m (if it was larger).
The algorithms were implemented in Python and the experiments were run on a MacBook Pro
laptop with a 3.1GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM. The results are displayed in
Table 1. Our algorithm is labeled “HLP”, the Freund and Schapire algorithm with m = maxi ci is
labeled “FS” and the Freund and Schapire algorithm with the more sophisticated choice of m as
described above is labeled “FS+”. We ran our algorithm, taking δ = δ0 and η = η0 (as defined in
the proof of Theorem 2).
The number of iterations of our algorithm is determined by our theoretical results. That is,
our theoretical results say that if you run the algorithm for a certain number of iterations, you are
guaranteed to achieve a certain accuracy. But, in fact, you may be able to achieve that accuracy
in fewer iterations in practice. So in our experiments, we explore both the number of iterations
needed for the algorithm to terminate, and the number of iterations needed to achieve the desired
accuracy.
The columns in Table 1 labeled “Convergence time” display what can be thought of as the
average time the algorithms took to converge “in practice”. More precisely, convergence time is the
number of iterations until we could be sure that both strategies converged to the desired accuracy,
so that the ratio of the maximum payoff guaranteed by Player I to the minimum payoff guaranteed
by Player II is no more than 1 + ε.
The columns in Table 1 labeled “Total time” indicate the average number of iterations until
the algorithms terminated. The time to produce each entry in the table (requiring running each
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algorithm on 5 or 10 different versions of the game) ranged from under one second to over 25
hours, depending on the setting of the parameters and the resulting number of iterations. We
did not optimize our implementation for speed. To avoid excessive processing time in running our
experiments, for ε = 5% and ε = 10%, we did not attempt to run an algorithm to termination.
If an algorithm exceeded 3 hours of processing time, we ensured it had converged to the desired
accuracy, and then terminated it prematurely. If any of the runtimes of the 10 instances of a set
fell into this category, the corresponding entries in the table are marked with an asterisk.
In order to calculate the “PI error” and “PII error”, for each experiment, we first calculated
the value V of each game, using the known closed form solution (see Subsection 1.1). Then, for
Player I, the error is the smallest p for which the final strategy output by the algorithm guarantees
an expected payoff of at least V/(1 + p); for Player II the error is the smallest p for which the final
strategy guarantees an expected payoff of at most V (1 + p).
The convergence times and total times are written to the nearest integer and the errors are
written in percentages to two decimal places.
Table 1: Table of results of numerical experiments.
Total time Convergence time PI error (%) PII error (%)
ε (%) Set HLP FS FS+ HLP FS FS+ HLP FS FS+ HLP FS FS+
5
1 16933 28553 11723 970 1394 1033 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.33 0.42
2 16422 22240 13761 911 1209 1045 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.33 0.37
3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1180 3470 1495 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.60 1.74 0.78
4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1176 3421 1496 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.61 1.78 0.78
10
1 4359 7835 3217 248 367 272 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.55 0.63 0.81
2 4232 6103 3777 233 320 276 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.62 0.70
3 6943 ∗ 6591 302 911 393 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.43 0.91 0.58
4 6944 ∗ 6606 300 897 394 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.42 0.92 0.57
50
1 214 584 241 12 21 16 0.15 0.07 0.11 2.65 2.37 3.07
2 209 455 282 13 21 19 0.14 0.06 0.10 2.40 2.33 2.64
3 340 2900 492 15 53 24 0.38 0.07 0.24 2.12 0.93 2.24
4 340 2894 493 14 53 24 0.36 0.07 0.24 2.24 0.94 2.23
100
1 66 261 108 2 3 3 0.38 0.11 0.20 4.76 3.66 4.72
2 65 203 126 3 5 5 0.40 0.11 0.15 4.53 3.54 4.05
3 104 1290 219 3 13 7 0.77 0.12 0.39 4.20 1.41 3.45
4 104 1287 220 4 15 7 0.75 0.12 0.38 4.15 1.43 3.43
We can see from Table 1 that HLP ran much quicker on average than FS (in the cases that
they both terminated) and ran quicker than FS+ for ε = 100% and 50%, but not for ε = 10% or
ε = 5%. In practice, HLP converged significantly more quickly on average even than FS+ for all
four values of ε.
Interestingly, by the time the algorithms stopped running, the actual error of the strategies was
far lower than guaranteed by the theory, particularly for large ε. Indeed, for ε = 100%, for example,
the average Player 1 error after the algorithms terminated was less than 1% for each of the three
algorithms, and for Player 2, was less than 5%. Comparing the total run times for ε = 100% with
the convergence times for ε = 5%, we see that in order to ensure an approximation ratio of ε = 5%,
it was generally quicker to run the algorithm for ε = 100%.
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Comparing the average errors across the three algorithms, we note that the average Player I
error for HLP was always at least as great as that of both FS and FS+. An obvious explanation is
that the former usually ran for fewer iterations. In separate experiments, we ran HLP for a number
of iterations equal to the maximum number of iterations performed by FS and FS+; in this case
we found that the Player I error for HLP was comparable to, and usually smaller than that of FS
and FS+.
For Player II, HLP had the smallest average error for both ε = 5% and ε = 10%. For the larger
values of ε, the average Player II error for HLP was comparable to that of FS+, and FS had the
smallest average error, which again can be attributed to longer runtimes.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how we may use an algorithmic approach to find solutions or approximate solutions
to search games, by exploiting oracles that find the best responses or approximate best responses.
This has applications to the search games we have mentioned in Section 5, but we believe it may
have further applications in other search games, and indeed in games studied in other fields of
operations research such as security games.
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Appendix
Equivalence of (1+ε)-Optimal Strategies and Relative ε-approximate Nash Equi-
libria for Zero-Sum Games
We show here that for small enough ε, our notion of (1+ ε)-optimal strategies is in a natural sense
equivalent to the notion of relative ε-approximate Nash equilibria for zero-sum games with positive
payoffs, from Daskalakis (2013).
Consider a (possibly non-zero-sum) two-player game, and for mixed strategies x and y of Players
I and II, denote the payoffs to the two players by C1(x,y) and C2(x,y), respectively. A relative
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) such that
C1(xˆ, yˆ) ≥ (1− ε)C1(x, yˆ) and C2(xˆ, yˆ) ≥ (1− ε)C2(xˆ,y)
for all strategies x of Player I and y of Player II.
Now suppose the game is zero-sum, so that C := C1 = −C2, and suppose some strategies (xˆ, yˆ)
define a relative ε-approximate Nash equilibrium. Let V be the value of the game and let (x∗,y∗)
be any optimal strategies. Then for any Player II strategy y,
C(xˆ,y) ≥
1
1 + ε
C(xˆ, yˆ) (16)
≥
1− ε
1 + ε
C(x∗, yˆ) (17)
≥
1− ε
1 + ε
C(x∗,y∗) (18)
=
1− ε
1 + ε
V (19)
≥
V
1 + 3ε
,
for all ε > 0. Inequalities (16) and (17) follow from the definition of a ε-approximate Nash equilib-
rium, inequality (18) follows from the optimality of y∗ and equation (19) follows from the definition
of the value.
It can be similarly shown that C(x, yˆ) ≤ (1+3ε)V for any Player I strategy x. So the strategies
(xˆ, yˆ) are (1 + 3ε)-optimal.
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Now suppose the strategies (xˆ, yˆ) are (1 + ε)-optimal. Then for any Player I strategy x,
C(xˆ, yˆ) ≥
V
1 + ε
(20)
≥
1
(1 + ε)2
C(x, yˆ) (21)
≥ (1− 3ε)C(x, yˆ),
for ε ≤ 1/3. Inequality (20) follows from the (1 + ε)-optimality of xˆ and inequality (21) follows
from the (1 + ε)-optimality of yˆ.
Similarly, it can be shown that C(xˆ, yˆ) ≤ (1 + 3ε)C(xˆ,y) for any Player II strategy y. So the
strategies (xˆ, yˆ) form a relative 3ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for small enough ε.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Consider the game whose n×n payoff matrix has the value n in the diagonal entries, and
the value 1 in all the off-diagonal entries. Then the value V of the game is 2 − 1/n ≤ 2. Suppose
Player II has a (1+ε)-optimal strategy y with support o(n)/εk. Then asymptotically, Player II can
ensure the payoff does not exceed maxxC(x,y) ≥ nε
k/o(n). Since y is (1 + ε)-optimal, it follows
that
nεk
o(n)
≤ max
x
C(x,y) ≤ (1 + ε)V ≤ (1 + ε) · 2.
But this implies ε
k
2(1+ε) ≤
o(n)
n , a contradiction. 
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Data for Numerical Experiments
Table 2: Randomly generated instances of BOX game. Entries in the table correspond to costs.
Instances
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Set 1
6 7 1 3 6 6 7 8 3 1
1 10 2 3 7 2 8 10 8 1
7 4 4 10 6 7 2 9 2 1
4 5 4 1 2 6 9 6 1 6
10 6 3 6 6 6 3 8 2 3
Set 2
57 47 44 99 22 89 95 12 10 8
7 42 100 10 31 66 8 52 96 32
81 70 67 9 79 90 12 30 1 13
82 4 11 32 79 17 63 62 9 32
48 71 5 83 45 92 32 2 59 63
Set 3
7 2 10 6 3 8 7 8 3 2
5 4 2 10 1 4 7 8 5 8
4 4 5 9 9 3 10 7 10 5
5 7 2 9 6 10 5 3 6 5
8 2 9 3 10 9 9 5 2 8
6 6 6 1 4 5 8 3 1 10
3 1 6 7 7 7 3 3 1 4
4 7 6 7 6 5 8 2 10 9
5 2 9 10 1 5 1 2 5 1
6 4 1 10 5 3 7 9 1 9
Set 4
58 51 56 11 70 15 96 54 65 62
12 78 99 38 83 65 71 58 41 30
35 100 87 51 59 99 69 65 39 96
35 25 87 14 84 14 84 14 7 67
46 47 90 8 16 98 39 98 60 60
2 33 45 27 15 40 61 18 90 36
72 96 76 57 73 90 6 15 43 25
91 51 66 22 60 86 91 61 77 74
6 28 65 27 45 53 38 57 8 98
54 62 17 26 88 84 86 74 5 73
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